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MALICIOUS PROSECUTION - IM-
MUNITY OF FEDERAL DISTRICT AT-
TORNEY. - [Federal] Wilburn P.
Hughes, U. S. District Attorney for
the Southern District of Florida,
and others instituted prosecution
against the plaintiff, a warrant wds
issued and the plaintiff was brought
before the United States Commis-
sioner for a hearing, the result of
which was the discharge of the
plaintiff for lack of evidence of
guilt. Later the defendant mali-
ciously procured an indictment
against the plaintiff, charging the
same offense and again the plaintiff
was discharged. After an appeal
from this judgment had been dis-
missed, the plaintiff sued for mali-
cious prosecution but was met by
the defendant's demurer. The plain-
tiff argued that the defendant's acts
were prompted by malice and con-
stituted a perversion of his office
which stripped him of his immunity
as a public officer. Held: demurrer
sustained. A public officer is not
liable for instituting a prosecution,
although he acts with malice and
without probable cause, provided the
matter acted upon is among those
generally committed by law to the
control or supervision of the office
in question and is not manifestly
or palpably beyond the authority of
such office: Anderson v. Rohrer
(D. C. Fla., 1933) 3 F. Supp. 367.
The court in the present case re-
NEWMAN F. BAKER, Faculty Adviser
lied upon Spalding v. Vitas (1895)
161 U. S. 483, 16 S. Ct. 631, where
the Postmaster-General of the
United States having acted pursuant
to an Act of Congress and in re-
spect of matters within his author-
ity was held not responsible in a
civil suit for libel based on official
communications made by him even
though personal motives prompted
his action. Other cases relied upon
by the court were Mellons v. Brewer
(1927) 57 App. D. C. 126, 18 F.
(2d) 168 and Dizazzo v. Pitach (C.
C. A. 2d, 1930) 40 F. (2d) 500. All
of these cases are libel actions and
not cases of malicious prosecution.
It is well settled that words pub-
lished in the course of judicial or
quasi-judicial proceedings and rele-
vant thereto are absolutely privi-
leged: Pecue v. West (1922) 233
N. Y. 316, 135 N. E. 515, but it
may be doubted whether the same
immunity should exist in respect to
malicious prosecution. It is equally
well settled, however, that quasi-
judicial officers are not so liable
while acting within th scope of
their official duties. The leading
case on this point is Griffith v. Slin-
kard (1896) 146 Ind. 117, 44 N. E.
1001, where a prosecuting attorney
maliciously included in an in-
dictment as a co-defendant one
against whom no evidence was
produced before the grand jury.
The same doctrine was enunciated
[118]
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in Yaselli v. Goff (C. C. A.
2d, 1926) 12 F. (2d) 396, where
a duly appointed special assistant to
the Attorney-General of the United
States in procuring an indictment
against the plaintiff for conspiracy
was held to be immune from civil
suit for malicious prosecution. A
review of the authorities may be
found in Watts v. Gerking (1924)
111 Ore. 641, 222 Pac. 318, where
the court chiefly relied upon Grifith
v. Slinkard, supra. There the dis-
trict attorney instituted criminal
proceedings against the plaintiff
causing him to be arrested, his home
searched and his property taken,
maliciously and without probable
cause, upon a charge which the dis-
trict attorney at the time knew to be
false. An action for damages for
malicious prosecution was brought
against the official but the court
followed the general rule. Similar
cases are Smith v. Parinan (1917)
101 Kan. 115, 165 Pac. 663 .(city at-
torney, acting in pursuance of an
ordinance held not liable in a civil
suit for malicious prosecution for
instituting an action maliciously and
without probable cause) and Sent-
rues v. Collins (1919) 120 Miss. 265,
82 So. 145 (attorney general acting
under authority of law wilfully and
maliciously instituted a suit but held
not civilly liable for damages). See
also Note (1924) 38 Harv. L. Rev.
262.
Under the general rule, the only
limitation placed on a prosecuting
attorney's immunity is the case
where he acts palpably beyond the
scope of his official duties. He is
selected to preserve the peace and
enforce the law by bringing offena-
ers to justice. Theretore, if he
prosecutes maliciously, knowing the
charge to be false, he is clearly
stepping beyond his authority: Yau
v. Carden (1916) 23 Hawaii 362.
On the other hand, public policy de-
mands that prosecutors be unre-
stricted by fear of civil liability. To
hold otherwise would detract from
the aggressiveness which the proper
discharge of his duties demands but
this does not mean that there should
be no restraint whatever. The
present case may indicate a possible
line of distinction, for here there
were two prosecutions against the
plaintiff for the same offense, both
unfounded. The repeated attempts
to prosecute with insufficient evi-
dence seem palpably beyond the dic-
tates of policy, and its sanction in
the instant case seems to be a mis-




eral] The defendant, Charles A.
Shepard, a major in the medical
corps of the United States Army,
was convicted of the murder of his
wife by poisoning her with bichlor-
ide of mercury. At the trial, the
government offered in evidence as
a dying declaration, the following
statement made by the deceased to
her nurse: "Dr. Shepard has poi-
soned me." The lower court held
the statement inadmissible as a dy-
ing declaration in that the govern-
ment failed to show "a settled, hope-
less expectation of death in de-
ceased." However, the statement
was admitted in evidence as show-
ing deceased's state of mind, to re-
but the inference of suicide which
might be made from other state-
ments offered by the defendant. No
instruction " was either requested or
given as to the purpose for which
the jury might use this declaration.
Held: on appeal, reversed. The
trial court should have instructed
the jury that the statements of de-
120 CRIMINAL CASES
ceased were offered to rebut evi-
dence of declarant's suicidal intent,
but that they were inadmissible as
dying declarations: Shepard v.
United States (1933) 289 U. S. 721,
54 S. Ct. 22.
From the facts surrounding the
,statement in question there would
seem to be little doubt that it was
inadmissible as a dying declaration.
It was made after two days of total
collapse and delirium, but when de-
ceased's condition was much im-
proved, and there was as yet no
thought by any of her physicians
that she was dangerously ill, still
less that her case was hopeless. The
evidence was properly excluded on
this ground, if offered as a dying
declaration, since an essential ele-
ment of such admission is a belief
on the part of the declarant in the
immediate certainty of impending
death: 3 Wigmore "Evidence" (2d
ed. 1924) §§1440-1.
While it is true that deceased's
statements could not be admitted as
dying declarations, yet, since there
was present the issue of suicide, the
declaration very properly comes un-
der the general rule that a state of
mind, if relevant, may be proved by
contemporaneous declarations of
feeling or intent: Wigmore, op. cit.
supra, §§1725-26; Commonwealth v.
Trefethen (1892) 157 Mass. 180. 31
N. E. 961; Mutual Lifc ins. Co. v.
Hillman (1892) 145 U. S. 285, 12
S. Ct. 909. When the statement of
the deceased-"Dr. Shepard has
poisoned me"--was admitted as evi-
dence to rebut a suicidal intent, or
as indicative of a will to live, it
should have been used to prove
merely the deceased's future intent;
but since the jury were not in-
structed as to its use they could
equally as well have used it as proof
of an act done by the defendant.
As Mr. Justice Cardozo pointed out
in the opinion, the latter purpose
could not be achieved by the use of
hearsay evidence, but direct proof
was necessary. He refused to al-
low the jury to make such a subtle
discrimination as to the use of the
evidence unaided by instructions.
The general rule in cases of mul-
tiple admissibility is that the com-
plaining party must call the atten-
tion of the court to any improper
use of evidence and request instruc-
tions on that point at the time it
occurs. If he fails to do so, an ap-
pellate court usually will not con-
sider such error even though it be
prejudicial: Bogileno v. United
States (C. C. A. 10th, 1930) 38 F.
(2d) 584, 587. But as the signifi-
cant dissent of the lower court in
the present case points out, Shepard
v. United States (C. C. A. 10th,
1933) 62 F. (2d) 683, there is an
important exception to this rule.
Namely, in the Bogileno case, supra,
it is said that in criminal cases in-
volving the life or liberty of the ac-
cused, the federal appellate courts
may notice and correct, in the inter-
est of a just enforcement of the law,
serious errors affecting the defend-
ant's rights, although these errors
were not challenged or reserved by
objections, exceptions, or assign-
ments of error. Accord: Van
Gorder v. United States (C. C. A.
8th, 1927) 21 F. (2d) 939; Lamento
v. United States (C. C. A. 8th,
1925) 4 F. (2d) 901; New York
Cent. R. R. v. Johnson (1929) 279
U. S. 310, 49 S. Ct. 300.
Cardozo, J., discussed and ap-
proved the vigorous dissent of Phil-
lips, J., in the lower court, though
putting the reversal on other
grounds as well. However, it may
be said that this case is another
step in building up effective safe-
guards against "railroading prose-
cutors." Too often today prosecu-
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tors are more desirous of obtaining
a large number of convictions than
of serving the ends of justice. Often
evidence is introduced with knowl-
edge of its certain inadmissibility
merely to get it temporarily before
the jury. The tendency on the part
of courts to abolish such practices
is in accord with the fundamental
public policy underlying the instant
case. As was said by the dissent
below, "that a defendant may be
'waived' into the p~nitentiary for
life is repugnant to my conception*
of justice."
It would be far better for judges
to protect the accused from the fail-
ure of his counsel to assert all his
rights, and to take an affirmative
stand to avoid flagrant miscarriages
of justice than to preside as mere
umpires in a game bitterly fought
between ambitious state's attorneys
and attorneys for the defense-a
struggle in which a premium is
placed on personal aggrandizement
rather than on a just result.
F. R. FirzsiMoNs.
RAPE-BLOOD TEST TO DETERMINE
PATERNITY.-[South Dakota] De-
fendant, Clement Damm, and his
wife were married in 1913 and in
1925 adopted twin girls who were
then about seven years of age. One
of the girls became pregnant and
gave birth to a female child on Sep-
tember 25, 1931. The defendant
was arrested upon a charge of sec-
ond degree rape, and upon trial was
convicted and sentenced to sixteen
years imprisonment: State v. Damm
(S. Dak. 1933) 252 N. W. 7.
The defendant offered to submit
himself to a blood test and asked the
court to require the prosecutrix and
her infant child to submit thereto,
but the motion was denied by the
court and upon appeal the defend-
ant assigns this as error. The Bern-
stein Blood Test here in question is
based on Mendel's law of heredity.
The human blood is divided into
four recognized types or groups:
AB, A, B, and 0, so grouped be-
cause the blood agglutinates differ-
ently in the four classes. If the
blood groups of the father and
mother are known, the blood group
of the child can be predicted to a
certain extent. Conversely, if the
blood group of the mother and child
are known it can be determined
what must have been the blood group
of the father, and consequently the
impossibility of certain paternity
may be effectively demonstrated.
Thus if the blood of both parents
falls into group AB, then the child
may be AB, A or B, but cannot be
0; if the parents are AB and 0,
the offspring may be A or B, but
cannot be AB or 0; if the parents
are B and 0, the offspring may be
B or 0, but not AB or A. Like-
wise in any other possible blood
grouping in the parents, it has been
determined by scientific experimen-
tation which group the offspring
may be and cannot be: Lee, "Blood
Tests For Paternity" (1926) 12 Am.
Bar. Ass'n J.; Ottenberg, "Medico-
legal Application of Human Blood
Grouping" (1921) 77 J. Amer. Med.
Ass'n 682; (1922) 78 J. Amer. Med
Ass'n 873; (1922) 79 J. Amer. Med.
Ass'n 2137. The blood test itself
is a laboratory procedure and re-
quires that a few drops of blood be
taken from the subject, which can
be done without pain or danger.
From the nature of the test it can-
not be determined with finality that
a particular person is the father, but
it is possible to exclude certain in-
dividuals whose blood falls within a
given group.
The actual use of the test is de-
pendent upon the power of the
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courts to compel the defendant, the
prosecutrix and the child to submit
to the drawing of the few drops of
necessary for the laboratory analy-
sis. Examination of the body of the
plaintiff is now frequent in civil
cases. Although such an examina-
tion was not allowed in England,
and the American jurisdictions are
divided on the question at common
law, statutes in many states now al-
low the defendant in personal in-
jury cases to require the examina-
tion of the plaintiff by a competent
physician. Under such a statute, it
has been held that the court had the
power to require a sample of the
plaintiff's blood to be taken for the
purpose of examination ahd analysis:
Hayt v. Brewster, Gordon & Co.
(1921) 199 App. Div. 68, 191 N. Y.
Supp. 176.
No uniformity of decision can be
found among the state courts as to
the power of the courts in criminal
cases to compel the defendant to
submit to a physical examination.
Some courts have excluded the testi-
mony of physicians where the de-
fendant was forced to submit to the
examination on the ground that it
is a violation of the constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination:
State v. Height (1902) 117 Iowa
650, 91 N. W. 935; State v. New-
Comb (1909) 220 Mo. 54, 119 S. W.
405; 4 Wigmore, "Evidence" (2d
ed. 1923) §2265. However, courts
have universally held it was not a
violation of the privilege to force
a person to be photographed, finger-
printed, or subjected to the Bertillon
measurements: Downs v. Swann
(1909) 111 Md. 53, 73 Atl. 653;
Kidd, "The Right to Take Finger-
prints, Measurements and Photo-
graphs," (1919) 8 Calif. L. Rev. 25.
In the light of the latter view, it
would seem that the courts would
have ample power to compel the
taking of blood for the test. From a
practical standpoint, however, the
defendant will not object because,
due to the nature of the test, it can-
not furnish conclusive evidence as
to his guilt, but, assuming the accur-
acy of the test, it may absolutely
prove his innocence.
A different question arises, how-
ever, as to the prosecutrix and the
child, who are not parties to the
suit, the prosecutrix being a mere
witness in a suit by the state. Some
courts have refused to force the
prosecutrix in rape cases to be sub-
jected to a physical examination on
the ground that by so doing many
women would be deterred from be-
coming witnesses: McGuff v. State
(1889) 88 Ala. 147, 7 So. 35; Mc-
Arthur v. State (1894) 59 Ark. 436
27 S. W. 628; Thomas v. Common-
wealth (1920) 188 Ky. 509, 222 S.
W. 591. Other courts have held
that the examination of the prosecu-
trix is discretionary and the abuse
of this power will not be reviewed
by the court on appeal: State v.
Pucca (1902) 14 Del. 71, 55 Atl.
831; Walker v. State (1915) 12 Okl.
Cr. 179, 153 Pac. 209; 4 Wigmore,
"Evidence" (2d ed. 1923) . §2216.
The same reasoning used by the
courts which refuse to subject the
prosecutrix to an examination could
hardly be applied to the simple mat-
ter of taking the blood test.
The accuracy of the test is gen-
erally accepted among medical au-
thorities. Such evidence has never
been used by the courts of this
country, although in the German,
Austrian, and to some extent in
Scandinavian courts the medical re-
port of such a test is admissible.
The test was accepted as evidence
in the British Isles for the first time
on January 24, 1932, by Judge Shan-
non of the Dublin Circuit Court: 66
Irish Law Times 64 (1932), 111
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(1932). Keeping in mind the fam-
ous saying of Sir Matthew Hale
that rape "is an accusation easily
to be made and hard to be proved;
and harder to be defended by the
party accused, though never so in-
nocent," no reason can be found
why the courts should fail to ac-
cept this advance of science in aid-
ing them to determine paternity.
The constitutional plea of self-in-
crimination has not prevented the
use of fingerprints, the X-ray, and
photographs; courts have required
physical examinations in civil cases,
and the same progress can now well
be made in regard to the use of ihe




DENCE.7-[Missouri] At the trial of
the defendant, which resulted in a
conviction of murder in the first
degree, a qualified expert (Major
Seth Wiard of the Scientific Crime
Detection Laboratory of Northwest-
ern University School of Law) was
permitted to testify as to the simi-
larity between the bullet removed
from the body of the deceased and
one fired from the rifle belonging to
the defendant. Upon appeal the ad-
mission of such testimony was as-
signed as reversible error. Held:
on appeal, affirmed. The rights of
the defendant were not prejudiced
by the admission of the "ballistics"
testimony: State v. Shirwley (Mo.
1933) 67 S. W. (2d) 74.
This decision is the first one in-
volving firearms identification testi-
mony rendered by an appellate court
of the state of Missouri, and it sig-
nifies the addition of that state to
the list of eleven other jurisdictions
whose superior courts have ap-
proved the use of such evidence in
criminal cases. The superior courts
of Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Massa-
chusetts, Montana, New Jersey,
Ohio, Oregon, Texas, Wisconsin-
and a Federal Circuit Court of Ap-
peals-have definitely held such evi-
dence admissible. See People v.
Fisher (1930) 340 Ill. 216, 172 N.
E. 743; State v. Campbell (1931)
213 Iowa 677, 239 N. W. 715;
Evans v. Commonwealth (1929) 230
Ky. 411, 19 S.W. (2d) 1091; Com-
monwealth v. Best (1902) 180 Mass.
492, 62 N. E. 748; State v. Vucko-
vich (1921) 61 Mont. 480, 203 Pac.
491; State v. Boccadora (1929) 105
N. J. L. 352, 144 Atl. 612; Burchett
v. State (1930) 35 Ohio App. 463,
172 N. E. 555; State v. Clark (1921)
99 Ore. 629, 196 Pac. 360; Kent v.
State (1932) 242 Ky. 80, 45 S. W.
(2d) 824; Galenis v. State (1929)
198 Wis. 313, 223 N. W. 790; Laney
v. United States (1923) 54 App. D.
C. 56, 194 Fed. 412. There is only
one decision to the contrary-Mat-
thews v. People (1931) 89 Colo.
421, 3 Pac. (2d) 409. The reason
for the rejection of the testimony
there was the improper presentation
of the evidence for the witness had
professed to be able to match fatal
and test bullets by means of a mag-
nifying glass.
The appellate courts of several
other jurisdictions (e. g., California,
Connecticut, Oklahoma, Virginia)
have indicated their approval of the
use of such evidence, although def-
inite holdings to this effect are
lacking. Moreover, it must be re-
membered that "ballistics" testimony
is not confined to the foregoing
jurisdictions. Hundreds of trial
cases in other states are never ap-
pealed upon that ground, presum-
ably for the reason that its admis-
sibility is not seriously questioned,
in view of the decided cases iii
other jurisdictions. See extended
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discussion of previous decisions and
of the science itself in (1933) 24
JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW AND
CRIMOLOGY 825.
The following extract from the
opinion of the court in the Sharwley
case indicates the importance of
testimony of this type where cir-
cumstantial evidence must be relied
upon to establish the guilt of an ac-
cused individual: "The strongest
evidence against the defendant, we
think, is the ballistics testimony.
The defendant admitted the rifle
was his. A microscopic examina-
tion of the bullet which killed Bar-
net Baxter indicated it had been
fired through that gun. Six photo-
graphs of part of the fatal bullet
brought into visual juxtaposition
with parts of test bullets were in-
troduced in evidence. We have ex-
amined them carefully. Owing to
the distorted condition of the fatal
bullet there is not a coincidence of
the ridges and groves clear around
its circumference, but at various
points the markings do correspond,
and at others a relation is indicated
as in the case of faults in stratified
rock. We cannot, of course, pass
independent, expert judgment on
these photographs no more than we
could interpret X-ray photographs.
But a qualified expert has testified
any given rifle will leave its own
peculiar, individual, microscopic
markings on any bullet.fired through
it, no two rifles the same, and that
in his opinion the fatal bullet was
fired through the defendant's rifle.
That rifle was found in the defend-
ant's bedroom the morning after the
homicide with fresh smudge on it,
and the defendant then said, and has
never since denied, no one had fired
but him. Nor did he explain at the
trial why the rifle gave evidence
of recent firing. Certainly this evi-
dence in connection with the other
facts was sufficient to take the case
to the jury."
FRED E. INBAU.
MURDER-HOMICIDE IN THE COM-
MISSION OF AN UNLAWFUL AcT-
SuIcIDE.-[Iowa] The defendant
called at the home of the deceased
to ask her to go out with him, and
upon her refusal he reached for his
revolver intending to "end it all."
She started to struggle with him,
the revolver was discharged and she
fell with two bullets in her body
from which she later died. An in-
struction to the jury stated that in
the eye of the law suicide was an
offense, an unlawful act, and if a
man with a deadly weapon under-
takes to take his own life and in the
commission or attempted commis-
sion of that act takes the life of an
innocent party then in the eye of
the law that is murder. On this
instruction the defendant was con-
victed of murder in the second de-
gree. Held: on appeal, reversed.
An attempt to commit suicide, not
being made unlawful by statute, is
not an unlawful act, and if the ac-
cused shot the deceased while at-
tempting to commit suicide, he was
not doing an unlawful act, and hence
not guilty of murder: State V.
Campbell (Iowa 1933) 251 N. W.
717.
The question here presented is
whether an attempt to commit sui-
cide is an unlawful act in the sense
that one who kills another while at-
tempting suicide, is guilty either of
murder or manslaughter. This par-
ticular question seems to have been
raised but rarely in this country for
only two cases were found to have
decided the point before the pres-
ent one: State v. Levelle (1891)
34 S. C. 120, 13 S. E. 321; Common-
wealth v. Mink (1877) 123 Mass.
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422, 25 Am. Rep. 109. Both courts
decided that it was an unlawful act
and allowed the conviction to stand,
while the court in the principal case
held to the contrary. At common
law, under an early Act of Parlia-
ment, suicide was a felony and pun-
ishable by forfeiture of goods and
chattels, ignominious burial, and in
theory at least, since suicide was
murder, by death. The attempt was
correspondingly a felony. Forfeit-
ure, being against general public
policy in this country, is now abro-
gated by statute and the ignominious
burial has either fallen into disuse
or has been abolished by statute.
Since the penalties for suicide are
gone it is not in reality an offense
with us. 1 Bishop, "Criminal Law"
(9th ed. 1923) §511. The question
of the criminality of the act thus
remains important only incidentally
in cases such as the present.
No general rule can be laid down
since the decisions must rest upon
the statutes of the particular state.
If.the attempt is specifically made a
crime as it was in New York until
1919, there would be no trouble in
sustaining the conviction. It is
where there is no statute on the sub-
ject and the courts must decide
whether the common law offense is
in force in the state that difficulty
arises. Two states have so inter-
preted their statutes as to recognize
the attempt to commit suicide as re-
taining its common law character
as a felony on the theory that all
common law offenses not specifically
dealt with in statutes are still in
force: State v. Carney (1903) 69
N. J. L. 478, 55 Atl. 44; State v.
Levelle, supra. Two other states
have held the attempt to commit
suicide not an indictable offense be-
cause no penalty now attaches to the
suicide if actually committed: May
v. Pennell (1906) 101 Me. 516, 64
Atl. 885; Commonwealth v. Mink,
supra. But the effect of this reason-
ing is to make the penalty determine
the existence of the crime rather
than the crime to determine the
penalty. It is to be noted that a
distinction is drawn in this situation
between an indictable offense and
an unlawful act. In the Mink case,
supra, the facts of which are almost
identical with those in the present
case, the court, admitting that the
attempt to commit suicide was not
an indictable offense, held that it
was wrongful and criminal as
inalum in se, and therefore a homi-
cide committed while attempting
such an unlawful act was murder
or manslaughter. The present de-
cision refused to follow this reason-
ing, holding that it was not enough
for the offense to be unlawful as
malum in se but unless the statute
made it so it was not unlawful, fol-
lowing Darrow v. tFamily Fund So-
ciety (1889) 116 N. Y. 537, 22 N. E.
1093. Inferentially, an Illinois de-
cision supports this position, for in
Burnett v. People (1904) 204 Ill.
208, 68 N. E. 505, it is stated that
Illinois has never regarded the Eng-
lish law as to suicide applicable to
the spirit of its institutions.
The view taken by the Iowa court
would seem to be the better one.
Today, statutes cover almost all of
the common law offenses and it is
only reasonable to infer that those
which are omitted were intended to
be excluded. This proposition is
quite generally accepted: People v.
Cleary (1895) 13 Wis. 546, 35 N.
Y. Supp. 588; Estes v. Carter (1860)
10 Iowa 400. Especially should this
be true when a man is on trial for
his life and every doubt ought prop-
erly to be resolved in his favor.
A larger question is also raised
here for, admitting that an attempt
to commit suicide is a crime, should
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a person who acidentally kills an-
other while attempting to take his
own life be deemed t6 come within
the principle that one committing a
homicide while perpetrating an un-
lawful act is guilty df murder or
manslaughter? Criminal statutes
should be strictly construed and not
extended to include an offense not
clearly within the fair scope of the
language employed. It is doubtful
whether state statutes of this type
were intended to be directed against
an offense of this nature. Rather
are they directed toward unlawful
acts against the person or property
of third persons. In fact, some
states avoid this uncertainty by spe-
cifically enumerating the unlawful
acts. In the absence of such a stat-
ute, however, a court might prevent
an unjust result by saying merely
that the general statute was clearly
not designed to include an offense
such as the one under consideration.
STANLEY A. TWEEDLE.
FELONY-MURDER-CONVICTION OF
ACCESSORIES TO THE FELONY.-[New
York] Deceased was found shot in
theback near the door of his store
above which he had his place of
residence. Although no eye wit-
nesses of the shooting could be
found four men were finally held
for, the murder. Fitzgerald and
Croghan, the actual perpetrators of
the crime, pleaded guilty of murder
in the second degree and were sen-
tenced to imprisonment. Ryan and
Venetucci were brought to trial as
accessories. There was 6vidence to
the effect that the four men had
planned-.to hold up deceased as he
was opening his store. Fitzgerald
and Croghan secured guns from
Ryan and, with Venetucci driving
Ryan's automobile, proceeded to the
scene of the crime. After the kill-
ing they returned to Ryan's apart-
ment, handed over the guns to Ryan
and told him that they had been
compelled to shoot deceased during
their attempt to rob. On the theory
that the defendants were accessorieb
t' a plot to commit robbery and that
the murder had taken place in the
furtherance of this plan, Ryan and
Venetucci were adjudged guilty of
first degree murder and sentenced
to die. Held: on appeal, reversed.
The evidence was not sufficient to
show that the murder had been per-
petrated in the execution of the fel-
ony and evidence of certain state-
ments of the killers had been er-
roneously introduced: People v.
Ryan (1934) 263 N. Y. 298, 189 N.
E. 225.
On appeal the court said that the
jury would be justified in finding
that Fitzgerald and Croghan com-
mitted the murder, but that that
alone was not sufficient to sustain
the conviction of Ryan and Vene-
tucci because in order to convict an
accessory for a felony murder it
must be free from reasonable doubt
that the murder was committed in
the execution of the conspired fel-
ony: People v. Sobieskoda (1923)
235 N. Y. 411, 139 N. E. 558. The
fact that such a killing has taken
place at the scene of the proposed
robbery was said by the court to be
important as evidencing a continu-
ance of the original crime but since
that circumstance was lacking here
it might have been possible for the
criminals to have shot deceased
while attempting an escape. In sup-
port of the conviction below the
prosecution argued that since de-
ceased had been shot in the back and
the bullet found in the store such a
possibility was not present. The
court, however, held that the ques-
tion was debatable and therefore
should have been sent to the jury
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with appropriate instructions as to
abandonment of the original plan.
There was no necessity for deciding
the question, however, since evi-
dence had been admitted which if
competent would decide the ques-
tion and if incompetent was revers-
ible error.
At the trial the prosecution had
introduced evidence tending to
prove that, on handing the guns to
Ryan, the killers had confessed to
having shot deceased during the at-
tempt to rob. The majority, on ap-
peal, held that this was incompetent
as hearsay and could not be intro-
duced as an admission, for the de-
fendants could not be held to have
admitted the truth of a statement
made by a third person in their
presence of which they had no per-
sonal knowledge. They further held
that it would not be admitted on the
ground that it was a declaration
made by a co-conspirator in the
prosecution of the enterprise for
when the statement was made all at-
tempt to carry out the conspiracy
had been abandoned and the narra-
tion by one conspirator of events
transpiring after the enterprise has
come to an end is not admissible in
evidence against another: People v.
Davis (1874) 56 N. Y. 95; Logan
v. United States (1891) 144 U. S.
263, 12 S. Ct. 617. Nor were the
criminals acting as agents for the
defendants when they made this ex-
planation to them. The introduc-
tion of this evidence was therefore
held reversible error.
In the dissenting opinion, Pound,
C. J., laying stress on the fact that
Ryan kept the guns and afterwards
hid them, that the killers started
from his apartment and returned to
it, that his car was used and that
Venetucci drove; pointed out that it
was impossible to escape the con-
clusion that the felonious intent of
the four conspirators had extended
to the time of their return to the
apartment. Therefore, he contended
that the trial court had not erred
in its failure to instruct upon
abandonment: People v. Sullivan
(1903) 173 N. Y. 122, 65 N. E. 989;
People v. O'Neil (1932) 260 N. Y.
523, 184 N. E. 77; People v. Raf-
faile (1922) 233 N. Y. 590, 135 N.
E. 930. The dissenting judge further
argued that the evidence in ques-
tion was competent since it was
proper to show that the guns were
returned to Ryan as tending to
prove that they were conspirators,
and that statements accompanying
and explaining the act were admis-
sible.
The taking of a human life while
engaged in the execution of a fel-
ony is murder in the first degree in
the state of New York. To convict
an accessory of a felony murder it
must be shown that the killing took
place while the parties were en-
gaged in carrying out the conspired
felony. The determination of the
time when the planned felony came
to an end is therefore a question in
many of such cases. From this
arises the further inquiry whether
this question must be sent to the
jury with appropriate instructions
or whether they may assume that
the murder took place during the
execution of the felony. It was held
in People v. Giro (1910) 197 N. Y.
152, 90 N. E. 432, and People v.
Michalow (1920) 229 N. Y. 325, 128
N. E. 228, that if the murder was
committed on the premises of the
original crime the jury might as-
sume that it was done in the execu-
tion of the felony, but in People v.
Smith (1921) 232 N. Y. 239, 132
N. E. 574, where a father and son
overcame a burglar, handcuffed him
and then turned their backs, giving
him the opportunity to grasp a gun
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and shbot, it was held that the cir-
cumstances were such that there
was a question for the jury as to
the abandonment of the enterprise.
Similar to the Smith case is People
v. Walsh (1933) 262 N. Y. 140, 186
N. E. 422, where the watcher for
the two men conducting the holdup
saw that they had been overpowered
and in making his escape from the
building shot a policeman. It was
there held to be clear that the rob-
bery had been abandoned and there-
fore it was a question for the jury
whether the original plan had in-
cluded the taking of all necessary
measures to escape. According to
these decisions, if the killing of de-
ceased had been on the premises,
even while attempting escape, the
jury could have assumed that it
was part of the commission of the
conspired crime for there are no
facts to bring it within People v.
Smith and People v. Walsh, supra.
The court said that the criminals
had the "express intention of hold-
ing up deceased when he opened
the grocery store." The door of the
store was closed and he was shot
in the back only eight feet from
the door. It is evident that the spot
where he was shot was the scene
of the original crime. Of course, if
they had been in the store and while
running out, intent upon escape, had
shot the deceased, the killing would
not have been on the premises:
People v. Marwig (1919) 227 N. Y.
382, 125 N. E. 535, but it is hard
to believe that either deceased or
one of the killers stopped to shut the
store door. There is a possibility
that having escaped down the street
the criminals turned and fired, but
considering that the bullet entered
through the back such a state of
facts is highly improbable.
Therefore, it would seem that this
case falls within the rule of the
Giro and Michalow decisions, supra,
but there is one very significant
point of distinction which must and
should have affected the decision.
Here the actual perpetrators of the
murder, evidently due to a "deal"
with the prosecutor, received a sen-
tence of imprisonment while the de-
fendants, not even present at the
scene of the crime, were sentenced
to die.
DAVID KIMBALL HILL.
